Re: Planning for Emergency restore

["Bryan Kaplan via tarsnap-users" <tarsnap-users@tarsnap.com>]

> Depends on the factos etc. a safe at a bank isn’t a bad option to consider.

Safe deposit boxes aren't safe.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/business/safe-deposit-box-theft.html

On Sun, Apr 4, 2021, at 12:43, hvjunk wrote:
> Storing the keys in your password store like BitWarden 
> 
> > On 04 Apr 2021, at 19:37 , jerry <jerry@tr2.com> wrote:
> > 
> >   With a complete tarsnap backup, I could restore everything... but the big bad trojan might have encrypted the filesystem with my tarsnap key!
> 
> What about you password manager as a storage? (Ie. Bitwarden is what I 
> use, and I share those keys with the needed people that needs to get 
> access in my absence)
> 
> >  Even though it's not a Samba share, and the directory is only readable by root, and the file is only readable/writable by root.   Actually, why should it be writable at all?  I'd never change it. "sudo chmod u-w tarsnap.key”.
> 
> you could try the immutable flag too, but the assumption here is the 
> ransomware got the needed root privileges to clear that flag too.
> 
> >  Anyway, in that situation, the tarsnap key becomes VERY valuable.  I suppose I could stick it on some encrypted media and keep it somewhere else.  Friend's house?  What if my house burns down?  A disk in the fire safe would probably get fried, but what about a piece of paper?
> 
> Depends on the factos etc. a safe at a bank isn’t a bad option to consider.
> 
> 
>