scrypt archive (by thread)

• Date Index

• Re: Stand-alone code for scrypt, (continued)
  • Re: Stand-alone code for scrypt, Iburi Noc
  • Re: Stand-alone code for scrypt, Colin Percival
• Scrypt security proof weakness?, Ryan Carboni
• OS support for scrypt, Nicolai
  • Re: OS support for scrypt, Colin Percival
  • Re: OS support for scrypt, Solar Designer
• Scrypt using SHA-3, Ryan Carboni
  • Re: Scrypt using SHA-3, Laurens Van Houtven
  • Re: Scrypt using SHA-3, Colin Percival
  • Message not available
    • Re: Scrypt using SHA-3, Ryan Carboni
      • Re: Scrypt using SHA-3, Colin Percival
• Debian Packaging Build Patches (aka bike shed painting), Barak A. Pearlmutter
  • Re: Debian Packaging Build Patches (aka bike shed painting), Colin Percival
• Behaviour with Null Bytes, Andrew Dunham
  • Re: Behaviour with Null Bytes, Colin Percival
    • Re: Behaviour with Null Bytes, Andrew Dunham
• Small fixes for compiling on Windows, Dāvis Mosāns
  • Re: Small fixes for compiling on Windows, Dāvis Mosāns
    • Re: Small fixes for compiling on Windows, Dāvis Mosāns
• Scrypt code repository?, Dāvis Mosāns
  • Re: Scrypt code repository?, Colin Percival
• Scrypt as a filter, Matthew Pherigo
• Building scrypt on Windows using Visual Studio 2008, Dinesh Shanbhag
  • Re: Building scrypt on Windows using Visual Studio 2008, Ted Unangst
    • Re: Building scrypt on Windows using Visual Studio 2008, Dinesh Shanbhag
• Re: [Cryptography] Why don't we protect passwords properly?, Arnold Reinhold
  • Re: [Cryptography] Why don't we protect passwords properly?, Krisztián Pintér
    • A modification to scrypt to reduce side channel risk, Arnold Reinhold
      • Re: A modification to scrypt to reduce side channel risk, Krisztián Pintér
      • Re: A modification to scrypt to reduce side channel risk, Colin Percival
      • Re: A modification to scrypt to reduce side channel risk, Bill Cox
      • Re: [Cryptography] A modification to scrypt to reduce side channel risk, Jerry Leichter
      • Re: A modification to scrypt to reduce side channel risk, Arnold Reinhold
• Is a constant time string compare necessary?, Laurens Van Houtven
  • Re: Is a constant time string compare necessary?, Solar Designer
• Canonical way to invoke the KDF?, Laurens Van Houtven
  • Re: Canonical way to invoke the KDF?, Kevin Cantu
  • Re: Canonical way to invoke the KDF?, Colin Percival
    • Re: Canonical way to invoke the KDF?, Ron Garret
      • Re: Canonical way to invoke the KDF?, Colin Percival
      • Re: Canonical way to invoke the KDF?, Ron Garret
      • scrypt with "odd" r or N (Re: Canonical way to invoke the KDF?), Solar Designer
      • Re: scrypt with "odd" r or N (Re: Canonical way to invoke the KDF?), Colin Percival
      • Re: scrypt with "odd" r or N (Re: Canonical way to invoke the KDF?), Solar Designer
      • Re: scrypt with "odd" r or N (Re: Canonical way to invoke the KDF?), Solar Designer
      • Re: scrypt with "odd" r or N (Re: Canonical way to invoke the KDF?), Colin Percival
    • Re: Canonical way to invoke the KDF?, Laurens Van Houtven
• Test vectors, vampire7
• small man page patch, Jean-Philippe Ouellet
• Possible double close in code, Barry Steyn